At the northeast tip of the African continent, less than 100 miles across the Gulf of Aden from the oil-rich Arabian peninsula, lies Somalia, an oddly shaped, desolate country where over half the people are nomads. Until December 1992, when Somalia rocketed to the top of America's foreign-policy agenda, its very name was unfamiliar to many Americans. But it is here, of all places, that the first prominent battle was fought over the purpose of America's post-Cold War foreign policy. At issue: Is there a humanitarian component to American foreign policy, and, if so, is it appropriate in certain circumstances to commit U.S. military forces toward these ends? The Somalia story now is a familiar one: In the summer of 1992, as Americans were focusing on other events--a looming presidential election, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's first official visit to Washington, and the Olympics in Barcelona--a crisis of extraordinary proportions began developing there. Three thousand Somalis a day were dying from starvation, and nearly two million were threatened by an unrelenting famine exacerbated by warlords who refused to allow safe passage of relief supplies. With these supplies blocked at the capital port of Mogadishu, the crisis unquestionably would deepen.
Slowly, word began reaching the West: Somalia was dying, and only assertive foreign engagement, probably including military involvement, could save it. But, given these terms, should it be saved? By late November, just weeks after George Bush's defeat by Bill Clinton, that question confronted the Bush administration.
Even before the Somalia crisis, an argument had surfaced (largely among Bush opponents) that American foreign-policy interests should be defined more narrowly. In their view, Washington had--through its foreign aid, reliance on the United Nations, and commitment of U.S. troops abroad--become too engrossed in problems tangential to the American interest.
From the coffee shops of politically consequential New Hampshire, where the theme was exploited by Republican challenger Pat Buchanan, to Congress, where it echoed, this view gained a significant number of converts across the political spectrum. Not surprisingly, as the Somalia crisis developed, the response from this constituency was uniform: Too bad for Somalia, but the United States has no business injecting itself into this quagmire. American problems at home, this foreign-policy school argued, were too severe to afford the luxury of solving problems in distant lands.
MORAL FOUNDATION TO FOREIGN POLICY
Yet, a contrary point was ultimately accepted by President Bush: For America to maintain credibility, it cannot abandon
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