Who had heard of David Koresh or the Branch Davidians before February 28, 1993, when a massive raid on their compound near Waco by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) resulted in the deaths of four ATF agents, the wounding of 20 others, and comparable casualties inside the compound? The resulting siege commanded by the FBI lasted until April 19, when an effort to insert tear gas throughout the compound and force the surrender of those inside led to a fire that totally consumed the structure. Nine persons survived, while 75 bodies were recovered. At least 17 children were among those who died, most of them infants or small children. Some were shot, stabbed, or bludgeoned by persons inside the compound. Others died from inhaling lethal fumes or asphyxiation. Some simply burned to death. This was the end of a process that, from its inception, had put the well-being of children inside the compound as a principal goal. Whether their deaths might have been avoided is really the only question worth asking.
President Bill Clinton directed Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and Attorney General Janet Reno to conduct thorough investigations of Waco, the former as to the ATF, the latter as to the FBI. Official reports have been issued by both departments, accompanied by various expert evaluations and recommendations for the future.
Questioning the official version of what happened at Waco does not condone the crimes committed by David Koresh and his followers, or their ruthless behavior on February 28. But only if we know the truth about Waco can we hope, with any realistic basis, to avoid similar events in the future.
THE EVENTS IN WACO: THE ATF
Here, few important questions remain unanswered, although we do not yet know why the ATF chose to mount a massive armed raid as its way of serving the warrants. Alternatives did exist. It might not have been reasonable just to walk up and knock on the door, but the possibility of arresting Koresh when he was away from the compound was eliminated from consideration on the basis of wholly inaccurate information that he never left it. Establishing a perimeter around the compound and then negotiating was eliminated for reasons the Treasury Department has found inadequate.
Once the decision was made to use force, a series of unbelievable blunders by senior ATF officials led to disaster. The plan might have succeeded if the factual assumptions on which it was based were valid--but they weren't.
The plan was absolutely dependent on surprise for success. In fact, the element of surprise was lost, the ATF commanders in Waco knew it had been lost,
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