|
|
|
| Current Issue |
|
|
| Resources |
|
|
|
Personhood, Abortion, and Rights: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin
| Article
# : |
11294 |
|
|
Section : |
MODERN THOUGHT
|
| Issue
Date : |
9 / 1993 |
5,071 Words |
| Author
: |
Morton Kaplan
Morton Kaplan is editor and publisher of the The World & I. |
Ronald Dworkin has an exceptionally distinguished reputation, which his new book, Life's Dominion, can only enhance. It is a beautifully and eruditely reasoned book, which includes the best defense of abortion on demand that I have ever read. It is fatally flawed, however, in both its conclusions and philosophy.
Dworkin believes that antiabortion positions are without constitutional foundation for two reasons: a First Amendment reason based on the argument that beliefs concerning the sanctity of life are quasi-religious, in which case the state has no right to impose its views on individuals; and the claim that the fetus is without interests and, therefore, is not a person and has no rights.
If the belief in the sanctity of life is religious to some extent, and this may not necessarily be the case, so is the perspective that exalts choice. If life does not have exalted value, if it is a matter only of Hobbesian survival, then neither do choice and dignity. (Indeed, the psychologist B.F. Skinner took the latter position.) Every society that sanctifies life also sanctifies at least some moral values that are central to character formation. In their absence, both life and choice would have sharply diminished value, a feature of some societies that we would not desire to emulate.
Dworkin's effort to claim on First Amendment grounds that these choices are entirely optional for the individual would fail any constitutional test, as shown by numerous restrictions on religious freedom, which the Court enforces when very important public policy issues are involved. The courts will order a blood transfusion to save the life of a child even when the parents object on religious grounds. Although I disagree with the Court's decision with respect to the religious use of peyote by some Indian tribes, my disagreement involves only where the line is drawn, not whether the state can impose restrictions under some conditions.
Furthermore, Dworkin's view of the impact that the sanctity of life consideration, if permitted, would have on the constitutionality of abortion is flawed. All religions, except those that accept absolute pacifism, permit life to be taken under some conditions. Except for Roman Catholicism, all religions permit abortion under some conditions. The sanctity of life does not determine decisions concerning whether abortions may be permitted or forbidden, although it may, like any moral consideration, influence them. The extreme position taken in Roe v. Wade, however, can best be defended by Dworkin's dichotomous position concerning
...
Read Full Article
Look for this article in Ask.com
|
|
