As a new government in Japan tries to navigate international waters, it continues to come across legacies from the past involving the rest of Asia that complicate Tokyo's goal of becoming fully accepted and integrated into the Asian mainland. Many of the problems will fade in time, but one issue-Japan's treatment of Asia during World War II-refuses to go away. This problem shades every action Japan takes on the mainland, whether it is economic, political, or diplomatic. Until Japan faces its wartime legacy, the rest of Asia will remain uncomfortable with Japan's long-term intentions at best and suspicious at worst.
Asia looks to Japan for three things: open markets to absorb its exports, technology transfers to stimulate its economic development, and investment to help build its industries. In each case, potential Japanese contributions to Asian economies are huge. For example, the vast majority of Japan's technology licenses and exports go to Southeast Asia, contributing to economic growth and industrial development. As the largest economy in Asia, Japan provides an accessible and affluent market of over 100 million consumers and leading industrial manufacturers. Every incremental increase in Asian exports to Japan means additional economic growth (and reduced dependence on the cyclical and sometimes politically uncertain U.S. markets).
Asians look toward Japan for these economic contributions with mixed emotions, however, because of its apparent refusal to "come clean" regarding its role in World War II. Despite the new Japanese government's direct apology for its actions, most Asian nations feel frustration over what it views as a refusal by both the government and its citizens to confront its past honestly and directly. Successive governments instead have referred vaguely to "regrets" for hardships experienced by Asians during that period, without implying that Japanese themselves are aware of their responsibility for those actions-whether it be attributable to prior or current generations of citizens, corporate leaders, and politicians.
By Japan's refusal to address the issue directly, each new investment, technology transfer, or other economic tie between Asia and Japan retains a threatening quality that undermines the potential for Japan to fully integrate itself with the mainland.
Instead of being fully embraced by Asian nations, Japan's economic and political activities, including its humanitarian and aid programs, are seen as potential revivals of the Greater Far East Co-Prosperity Sphere. While accepting that technology-licensing programs, foreign direct investment, and the interactions that come with such developments have direct benefits to their
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