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America's Russian Conundrum
| Article
# : |
10181 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
Date : |
8 / 1993 |
2,098 Words |
| Author
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Andrew C. Goldberg
Andrew C. Goldberg is vice president of crisis communications
at Burson-Marsteller, a public relations firm in New York
City. He is also senior associate at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, D.C. |
Concern over Russia's future, and that of neighboring republics, still hangs like a storm cloud over official Washington. The issues debated among the nation's policy analysts are a mixed bag. Some are ideological, some economic, most having to do with national security.
The issues fall under several categories: the U.S. stake in the struggle between parliamentary democracy and authoritarianism in Russia; the likelihood and advantages of Russia making the transition to a market economy; fears of a return to military expansionism, perhaps engendered by the collapse of democratic reform; and finally the prospect that Russia will lose control over its nuclear weapons, creating a monumental proliferation problem.
Each of the above elements impacts on the others: A successful transition to democracy seems to demand economic reform, while a true shift toward capitalism implies a radical overhaul of the existing political system. Both economics and political stability also invade the defense and security issues.
A stable, nonconfrontational Russia in sound control over a small number of nuclear weapons is essential to the world's safety. The questions for U.S. policy, though, are how and how much the United States can shape Russia's future in ways that benefit U.S. national interest.
The Clinton's administration's approach to Russia shares common features with those of his predecessors. Three characteristics in particular stand out. First, a strong faith and enormous political investment in personal presidential relationships, of the sort that Nixon had with Brezhnev and Reagan and Bush had with Gorbachev. Second, the optimism that democratic reforms would provide insurance against a return to Russian imperialism. Finally, the belief that economic aid can simultaneously accelerate Russian economic reform and provide a favorable environment for political change.
From the very outset, President Clinton moved actively to embrace Boris Yeltsin, making it clear that Yeltsin's political survival remained the key to good political and economic relations with the West, and ultimately to Russian prosperity.
Last April, in anticipation of a national vote of confidence on Yeltsin, Clinton scripted a convivial walk-in-the-woods summit with Yeltsin and outlined an accelerated $700 million aid package to Russia. Later, on being charged with pusillanimity by
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