|
|
|
| Current Issue |
|
|
| Resources |
|
|
|
Korea: Peace Without Unification?
| Article
# : |
20416 |
|
|
Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
|
| Issue
Date : |
3 / 1992 |
2,154 Words |
| Author
: |
Allen S. Whiting
Allen S. Whiting, director of the East Asian Studies Center at
Arizona State University, is the author of served books on the
Far East |
North and South Korea made more progress toward peace in the last half of 1991than at any other time since the devastating conflict of 1950-53. Pyongyang abandoned its opposition to dual membership in the United Nations. It accepted Seoul's legitimacy by concluding an agreement of reconciliation, nonaggression, cooperation and exchange. Both sides pledge to sign a peace treaty to replace the armistice of nearly 40 years. The North even agree to International atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of its much disputed nuclear facilities, dropping its precondition that Washington confirm Seoul's claim that all nuclear weapons have been removed from the South.
Does this rush of concessions by Pyongyang foreshadow more substantive compromises leading to the unification of North and South? Or will Kim II Sung repeat his past pattern of moving one step forward and a half-step back in the hope of eventual collapse in the South? What explains the Hermit Kingdom Korea's traditional identify opening doors in the North after so many years of paranoic posture?
Kim and Glasnost
Kim II Sung did not emulate Mikhail Gorbachev in proclaiming much less practicing glasnost. North Korea is more isolated than any other country in the world now that Albania has opened up. But a clear combination of factors compelled the "Great Leader" to change course. His alternative is to risk total isolation in the new economic order emerging in East Asia. Moreover a worst-case fear of attack from South Korea, backed by a United States emboldened by its Gulf War victory, confronts Pyongyang with uncertain support from China and disintegration of the Soviet Union.
First and foremost among the factors compelling change was the fact that in the mid 1980s, both Moscow and Beijing simultaneously moved toward mutual détente and closer relations with Seoul. Economic necessity prompted a reduction of tension and military investment along the 4000 mile Sino-Soviet border (excluding Mongolia). Economic modernization invited South Korean trade, investment, and technology transfer for both countries.
The combined effect inflicted a double blow to Pyongyang. First, the Sino-soviet détente needed for Pyongyang the benefits it had derived from playing on the long-standing competition between Moscow and Beijing for influence in North Korea, especially in terms of acquisition of advanced military weaponry. Second, as Sino-south Korean trade mounted to some $3 billion
...
Read Full Article
Look for this article in Ask.com
|
|
