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Facing Two Possible Futures
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# : |
20051 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
Date : |
12 / 1992 |
2,298 Words |
| Author
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Stephen Haseler
Stephen Haseler is professor of government at City of London
College and a fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, D.C. |
As 1992 draws to a close it is becoming clear that the great project of European unity is in more trouble than at any time since the Common Market was founded in 1957. This uncertain chapter opened in September when President Francois Mitterrand called a referendum of the French people in order to ratify the Maastricht Treaty on Euro union.
Although Mitterrand's gamble was an act of political guile--to split the French Right and thus improve his credibility as president--the vote served a greater purpose. It revealed that public support for the unification process is lukewarm. And the resulting wafer-thin French "yes," or "petit oui" (it secured only 51 percent of the vote over an odd combination of farmers, communists and Rightists around Le Pen) came on the heels of a Danish popular rejection of the treaty and growing disenchantment with the Euro ideal in Germany and Britain.
Indeed, if the "no" vote had won the day then not only the Maastricht Treaty but also monetary and economic cooperation in Europe might have started to unravel.
However, as Winston Churchill once declared, "in a democracy one vote is enough." And the French victory for Maastricht became the launching pad for a renewed campaign for the union led by Germany and France. Indeed, the very first act of the German chancellor after the result of the referendum was known was to fly to Paris to congratulate Mitterrand. By all accounts this fateful meeting not only renewed the Kohl-Mitterrand joint vision of a united federal Europe but cemented the Franco-German axis as its core component.
Both France and Germany need "ever closer union," the code term for the creation of a new European superstate. Mitterrand needs it in order to secure the future against an unanchored Germany tempted to play off East and West against each other and act unilaterally. The French also see great economic gains from a European financial regime determined by German-style financial rectitude.
The German chancellor, on the other hand, sees Euro union as part of the same process as German reunification--simply the "other side of the coin." He argues--to anyone who will listen--that above all Germany needs geostrategic stability, the kind of order that in a rapidly changing Eurasia (an unstable eastern Europe and fracturing Balkans) only the Maastricht Treaty can guarantee. Also, the Germans know full well that the big issues they face--not least tightening up on immigration and asylum
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