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In Search of a Foreign Policy
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19984 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
Date : |
8 / 1992 |
2,354 Words |
| Author
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Vladimir Petrov
Vladimir Petrov, Emeritus Professor of International Affairs
at George Washington University and a native of Russia, has
authored several books and many articles about Russia.
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Russia's foreign relations will depend to a great degree on two factors. One is the pace of devolution of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a near-mythical body without address or phone number but having command of the former Soviet armed forces, which are responsible for the security issues of all successor states.
Another is the direction of Russia's domestic politics. Opponents of President Boris Yeltsin manifest emotional attachment to Russia's great-power status and clamor for imposition of its will on other CIS states. How to do it, no one quite knows, for in its present chaotic condition Russia can neither bribe nor coerce them. The latter course is additionally foreclosed by the watchfulness of the West, which is not yet fully convinced of Russia's democratization.
The state of frustration among Russian patriots is further aggravated by the assertive nationalism of former Soviet wards. By posing as victims of historical Russia, they get away not only with defiance of Moscow but with antidemocratic practices in their domestic politics as well.
Because these new states are not yet fully independent, Russia could be tempted to overplay its hand. However impoverished, it dominates the landmass from the Baltic to the Pacific. "External" borders of the former Soviet Union are still controlled by Moscow while most "internal" borders remain open; no passports or visas are required for travel from one republic to another.
The battered ruble remains legal tender everywhere, and Russian is the lingua franca in all international gatherings, transactions, and communications. Embryonic national armies have no credible defense capability, although CIS armed forces seem to respond to the Russian government, entrusted by the United States with safeguarding the strategic nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union.
Yet Moscow cannot realize this seemingly impressive coercive potential. No one wants to restore the crumbling centralized economy. Russia can experiment with reforms but cannot force other republics to duplicate them. Its printing presses must supply any amount of rubles to make up for their awesome budget deficits or face introduction of new national currencies. And even if President Yeltsin assumed authority over the bulk of CIS armies, he would be foolhardy to test their loyalty in trying to affirm Russia's supremacy.
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