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Balancing the New Order
| Article
# : |
19695 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
Date : |
9 / 1991 |
3,131 Words |
| Author
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Dimitri Simes
Dimitri Simes is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace where he directs the U.S.-Soviet
Project. |
After months of despair and disarray, Soviet reformers have finally been able to get their act together and regain political momentum. One sign of their new self-confidence is the creation of the Democratic Reform Movement, an umbrella group of prominent politicians who favor radical change.
Although the radical reformers are still in the opposition in the central government and the Soviet parliament (the Congress of People's Deputies), they now control several key positions at both the republic and local levels. Moreover, with newly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin at their center, the radical reformers have gained a meaningful role in running the Soviet Union as a whole. This was made possible in part by the new Union Treaty. Often referred to as nine-plus-one, the agreement was discussed at a country mansion in the Moscow suburb on Novo-ogarevo and signed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics.
A variety of factors have contributed to the change in fortune of the proponents of reform. First, Gorbachev's experimental attempt to stabilize the country through a semi-alliance with nostalgic reactionaries has been a dismal failure. The perception in the republics that the Gorbachev government was turning against their national aspirations only accelerated the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Also, the highly advertised economic stabilization measures introduced by Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov had precisely the opposite effect and were quite destabilizing. His antiinflationary measures lacked coherence and were introduced so clumsily that they only contributed to further economic deterioration. Anyway, Pavlov's widely unpopular government lacked the legitimacy needed to introduce the essential but painful market oriented reforms.
After Gorbachev rejected the 500-day radical reform economic program last September, he gave the impression that brute force could become his instrument for governing. However, Gorbachev proved to be a reluctant wielder of power--prepared to go just far enough to irritate and alarm his opponents, but not far enough to make a real difference. Gorbachev looked as uncomfortable and out of place in his role as savior of the old system and empire as he has looked earlier as their destroyer. The Soviet president initially gave the green light for a show of force, first against the secessionist governments in the Baltic republics and then against the democratic forces in Moscow itself. But, when the target of intimidation refused to surrender and the first drop of blood was shed thereby raising fears of a major confrontation, he pulled back and disclaimed
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