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Arabs and Israelis: Ripe for a Breakthrough?
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19312 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
Date : |
6 / 1991 |
2,617 Words |
| Author
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Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
Bruce Maddy-weitzman is a visiting Middle East fellow at the
Carter Center of Emory University and research associate at
the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
of Tel Aviv University. |
From the moment that Saddam Hussein's forces occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990, it was clear that a confluence of interests existed between Israel and a number of important Arab states. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the remaining Gulf principalities, and Syria all had, like Israel, an overriding interest in checking Hussein's bid for regional hegemony and preserving the existing balance of power.
Moreover, as the crisis unfolded, the Arab members of the anti-Hussein coalition came to agree with Israel, however reluctantly, that Iraq's military machine needed to be smashed. During the war itself, Israel showed great sensitivity to coalition exigencies and avoided retaliating against Iraqi missile attacks. Although it is unlikely that they would have abandoned the fight against Hussein, Arab coalition members were nevertheless uneasy about appearing to fight in the same trench with Israel against another Arab country. They were visibly relieved, and even appreciative, when Israel exhibited restraint.
The initial euphoria generated in the West by the coalition's overwhelming military success against Iraq was not limited to the Gulf arena. Phase one of fashioning the "new world order" had been achieved. Now, went the thinking, it was time for phase two: achieving a diplomatic resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. With America's prestige and credibility at an all-time high, and with Israel and the Arab states newly aware of both the benefits of accommodation with one another and the need to press forward toward a diplomatic solution, the situation was more ripe for a breakthrough than at any time since the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978.
To what extent is this vision congruent with the reality on the ground? Is the Arab-Israeli conflict in fact less intractable and thus more amenable to diplomacy than in the past? Was the initial euphoria just another case of exaggerated optimism expressed by those who do not really understand the wide gulf that continues to separate the parties?
To begin to answer these questions, one must examine both the impact of the Persian Gulf War on the parties--Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians--and their immediate priorities in the coming months.
For Israel, the implications of the war are mixed. The vulnerability of Israel's civilian population to missile attacks was traumatic. Moreover, it drove home a point that Israelis have been trying to make for years: that Israel's problem is not just
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