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Perspectives on the Defensive Transition
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11055 |
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Section : |
MODERN THOUGHT
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| Issue
Date : |
6 / 1986 |
6,702 Words |
| Author
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Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus
Alvin M. Weinberg is a Distinguished Fellow and Jack N.
Barkenbus is a political scientist at the Institute for Energy
Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. |
A Strategic Stalemate
Nuclear arms negotiations during the 1980s have borne no fruit despite the public pronouncements of both Soviet and American leaders favoring radical reductions in their nuclear arsenals. The absence of progress in moving toward this goal can be, and has been, attributed to many factors-most frequently to the intransigence of one or the other superpower. Unless some "give" in superpower positions is forthcoming, the arms race is destined to continue.
Perhaps the key area where "give" or accommodation must be found is in ballistic-missile defense. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has insisted that Soviet agreement to reduce the number of its strategic nuclear weapons is contingent upon the United States' agreeing to ban all "purposeful" research, development, and testing on advanced, or space-based, ballistic-missile defense technologies. President Reagan, whose advocacy of advanced ballistic-missile defense led to the creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as "Star Wars," has steadfastly refused to compromise his policy of full speed ahead when it comes to defensive technologies. This fundamental disagreement constitutes the primary arms-control impasse today.
Soviet disapproval of the SDI is not surprising. The Soviet achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States through massive expenditures an offensive nuclear arms during the 1970s and 1980s. The prospect of this formidable force being negated by American technology and engineering prowess is not a pleasant one for Soviet leaders. Moreover, Reagan's radical shift in nuclear doctrine, emphasizing the virtues of defense, caught the Soviet by surprise, as it did virtually everyone else.
A meeting of the minds on this issue will be difficult but not impossible. The Soviets must allow research and development to proceed, and must be willing to see defenses deployed gradually. The Reagan administration and future administrations, on the other hand, must be willing to accept some research and deployment constraints and go forth with the SDI in an arms-control framework.
The primary mechanism we advocate for bridging the Soviet American impasses and for facilitating a defensive transition is something we call the Defense Protected Build-Down (DPB). Simply stated, DPB is the formal coupling of missile defenses to arms reductions. tn entails, in other words, the simultaneous and commensurate buildup of missile defenses, with
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