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Commentary on William Folz's Article
| Article
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10068 |
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Section : |
MODERN THOUGHT
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| Issue
Date : |
4 / 1986 |
1,365 Words |
| Author
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Mortan A. Kaplan
Morton A. Kaplan is Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago and editor and
publisher of The World & I. |
Professors Foltz has presented a splendid account of the role of Africa in the world, the history of American involvement in the area, and the strategic importance of Africa in terms of American interests. The areas in which I would take issue with him are perhaps minor. Professor Foltz accepts the conclusion of a recent Rand report that Ascension and Diego Garcia islands "in conjunction with adequate air refueling assets, [would permit] the United States to conduct significant logistic operations almost anywhere on the globe." He then adds: "This would represent, of course, an extreme case, but it does point up that rather than proliferation of integrated military bases, what the United States--or any global power--needs is friendly access, refueling and overflight arrangements with well-placed ports and air fields."
I am willing to concede that in certain minor affairs this conclusion may follow. Bases, however, are very important, although they may be so politically counterproductive as to be contraindicated. I seriously doubt that "friendly access, refueling, and overflight arrangements" would permit the United States to do much more than to show the flag in the Middle East against any Soviet operation. The concentrated shipments from nearby supply depots that basing permits would be absent. Thus, the facilities of which Professor Foltz writes might permit the United States to provide marginal assistance to a beleaguered government fighting an internal uprising. In the absence of a local ally with considerable staying power, the military capability of the United States to influence political changes in Africa is quite small except when the popular and institutional base that supports the government or a revolutionary group is minimal. For instance, I believe that it would be relatively easy to support a revolution in Ghana.
The victory of the Marxists in Angola could have been prevented. Here, however, it would have been continued South African intervention, assisted by the United States, rather than American intervention alone, that would have produced this result. Contrary to what Professor Foltz suggests, I do not believe that the Cuban and Soviet presence was a significant deterrent to United States intervention. It was the United States Senate that prevented the effective intervention that otherwise would have occurred.
However, unlike Professor Foltz, I see very clear American interests in not opposing the destabilizing tactics of the Republic of South Africa in Angola, for instance, although I do agree that it would be a serious mistake for us to cooperate with the Republic in its activities. For both
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