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Can Nakasone and Gorbachev Deliver the Peace Treaty?
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10033 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
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4 / 1986 |
1,150 Words |
| Author
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Tetsuya Kataoka
Tetsuya Kataoka is a research fellow at the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University. |
Watching Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomacy both before and after he succeeded Konstantin Chernenko, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone raised quiet hopes that perhaps the Soviet secretary general is ready to initiate a change in Soviet policy toward Japan, which in the past could have been described as "rudeness wrapped in crudity inside a mailed fist," to paraphrase Winston Churchill.
It is evident that the Soviet position has been stymied and is deteriorating, thanks in large measure to President Reagan's efforts to restore the strategic balance of power and to champion the Strategic Defense Initiative. In light of Reagan's military buildup and the prospects of being "outspent" in the arms race, the Soviets turned, logically enough, to Japan, which has investments of between $50-60 billion a year in America and has the high-tech know-how to build electronics equipment readily adaptable to space weapons.
Moscow initiated its move toward Tokyo about the time Gorbachev was wooing the French during his state visit to France.
Change in style
During his visit to Tokyo in January, the first in 10 years by a Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze was all smiles, understatements, and civility. He was roundly applauded by the Japanese public for his apparent change in Soviet diplomatic style. In a joint communiqué, he and his Japanese counterpart, Shintaro Abe, agreed to negotiate the peace treaty "including those problems which might constitute the content for the said treaty." The "content" must include, insisted Abe, the territorial settlement of four islands off Hokkaido, called the Northern Territories in Japan, which are under Soviet occupation. Former Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko used to refuse all negotiations unless Tokyo gave up the territorial demand.
In contrast, Shevardnadze denied any change in the Soviet position but admitted that he cannot refuse Japanese discussion of the issue during peace negotiations.
Shevardnadze's concession may appear to be a sleight of hand, but it made possible the opportunity for both sides to move away from the deadlock in bargaining and to take one step forward. The communiqué also included an agreement to regularize the annual foreign ministerial meeting and to exchange visits between Gorbachev and the Japanese prime minister. When Gorbachev comes to Tokyo it will be the first time any
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